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Abstract
We examine whether a local regional government should privatize its local public firm in
mixed duopoly when it faces the unidirectional transboundary pollution problem. We consider
two regions in an economy, one located upstream and the other, downstream, and analyze the
economy for all location patterns of the firms and the two types of transboundary pollution
(transboundary pollution caused by consumption and that which is caused by production).
We consider the case where the丘action of transboundary pollution is such that the eqm-
hbrmm outcome before and after privatization is the same. we also show that when there is
a change in the fraction of transboundary pollution, (1) in some cases, privatization is desir-
able for both the local regional government that owns> the local public丘rm and the central
government of the economy, (2) however, there also exist cases where privatization is only
desirable for the local government.
JEL classification L13, L33, H23, Q53
Keywords Mixed Duopoly, Privatization, Transboundary pollution
l … Introduction
Phenomena attributed to transboundary pollution, such as acid ram and water or air pol-
lution, have been attracting attention since the middle of the 19th century.…　Acid iain has
been recognized as a serious environmental problem in Europe・ Fuithei, since the pa*.t few
decades, acid ram has become a serious pioblem in East Asia, in particular, in China 'Such
t Faculty of ll蝣conomics, Asia University, 5-24-10 Sakai, Muhashmo shi, Tokyo 180-8629, Japan,
E-mail kkato@asia-u ac jp
) See Nagase a.,nd Silva (2007) for more details as they have smveyed thih extensively
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phenomena that are attributed to transboundary pollution are often considered to have been
caused by production… However, such phenomena can also be caused by consumption Re-
cently, there has been a shift to a coユisumeristic way of life and consequently, trash generation
has increased. Often we come across mshores where trash and medical waste emitted by an
upstream country or region get transmitted to other downstream countries or regions For
example, for the past several years, trash thought to have been generated by Russia, China,
and Korea has been regularly found to have washed up on the shores of northern Japan
In ordei to solve this problem, working-level talks between Japan and Korea took place m
February, 2009
Meanwhile, global warming continues to worsen all across the world There is a possibility
that global warming will affect the fraction of transboundary pollution Global warming may
result in the westerlies becoming meandering. This may result in the extreme weather, further
natural caramities such as兄oods, heavy rains, and hun icanes may become more frequent and
as a result, may become more of an issue in the future The meandenng of the westerlies will
also affect the fraction of present transb0-mdary air pollution and fraction of transboundary
acid ram. Heavy rains transport the trash in a city that lュes on a hverbed and the trash stored
that is in waste-collection points dotting the river front into the river. Floods then transfer
this trash from upstream regions to downstream ones. An increase in the atmospheric temper-
atuie and seawater surface level, and a decrease m the salinity of the seas because of melting
glaciers may alter the flow of the oceans, and thus, affect the fraction of transboundary of sea
trash pollution. From these facts, we conclude that there is a possibility that the influence of
transboundary pollution vanes even if the total pollution remains unchanged
ln some of the countries and regions mentioned above, we can observe that there still exist
mixed markets where public丘rms and private firms compete. In mixed markets, privatiza-
tion of a public firm is a major issue If privatization occurs, public firm's objective changes
This alters the market equilibrium and leads to changes in pollution. Therefore, privatization
in one country affects not only its welfare but also the welfare of other countries which are
affected by transboundary pollution,
Keeping in mind these points, in our model, we have two regions, one upstream and the
other, downstream, and one public firm and one private firm. The location of each丘rm and
the type of pollution (pollution calused by consumption and that caused by production) are
lso considered We examine whether privatization of the public五rm in one region enhances
welfare in the legion and the welfare in the whole economy when the fraction of transboundan'
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pollution (0) vanes for every location pattern of the firms and for all types of pollution
The main lesults obtained in the paper are as follows. Suppose that there exists 9 such
that the equilibrium outcome before and after privatization is the sai-1e When the fraction
of transboundary pollution changes marginally at 9, (1 ) in some cases, privatization enhances
both local welfare (welfare of the region where the public firm is located) and whole welfare
welfare of the whole economy), (2) however, there also exists cases where it only enhances
local welfare
The intuition behind the results is as follows When the fraction of transboundary pollu-
tion changes marginally at 6, the public firm changes its output to decrease environmental
damage… Note that whether the pubhぐfirm increases 01 decreases its output depends on the
location of each丘rm and the type of pollution. This alters the output of the private firm
(strategic substitution effect) and leads to a change m producer surplus. Though, in many
cases, the environmental damage decreases in the region where the public丘.rm exists, there is
a possibility that the environmental damage m the entire economy increases. Thus, the effect
of privatization on local welfare and whole welfare may differ in each case
Many earlier works on the mixed oligopoly analyze within the framework of Defraja and
Delbono (1989).2'In recent years, some researches have addressed the environmental problem.
Barcena-Rmz and Garzon (2007), Beladi and Chao (2006), Ohori (2006a), and Kato (2006)
;xamine environmental regulation m a mixed oligopoly and analyze the e斤ect of privatization.
Cato (2008) investigates* the relationship between the degree of environmental damage and
privatization. These works deal with the environmental problem in one region and therefore,
do not consider transboundary pollution
Many eai her works have discussed the transboundary pollution problem, in particular, Na-
gase and Silva (2007) are closely related to our paper They co-isider the situation where
there is an upstream region (China) and a clownstreai-i region (Japan) and examine an envi-
ronmental policy-making game between the two under the bilateral transboundaiy pollution
problem・j)
The remindei of the paper is organized as follows Section 2 describes our model… Section 3
derives the equilibrium in pure duopoly Section 4 derives the equilibrium in mixed duopoly
and compai es the local welfare of each region and whole welfare before and after privatization
i (1991) leviews a mixed i-1arket
') Nagase and Silva (2007) consider a competitive market and allow abatement effort and an ei一一isaion
tax policy They do not consider a mixed duopohstic market
徳満蝣'/-虹聖　戦3Jき　れ1蝣''蝣'蝣
when the pollution is caused by consumption. Section 5 derives and compares the same when
the pollution is caused by production. Section 6 concludes the main text. Appendices provide
detailed calculations for the equilibrium outcome in each case and the proof of Proposition 4…
2. Model
Suppose an economy of two regions, region A and B Region A is located upstream and
region B, downstream. In this economy, there is one local public丘rm (丘　t 0) owned by
one local regional government and one private丘rm (丘im 1). Both produce a homogeneous
product that harms the environment. We call this product a "dirty good."
Firms 0 and 1 compete m quantity The output of丘rm i is denoted by qt (i - 0,1). Total
output is Q - qo +Qi- The cost function offirm i is cJqA. The profit offirm i is
t.(90,?i) -p(Q)ォ. - <*(?.),
where p(Q) is the inverse demand function of the dirty good We assume that the dirty good
can be transmitted from region k to region I (k ≠ ',, k, I - A, B) without any transportation
costEL
A representative consumer exists in each region The representative consumer in the region
where鮎m 0 exists is called the "active consumer" while the representative consumer in the
other region is called the linactive consumer.鵬> The active consumer consumes the dirty
;ood and a clean numeraire good. The inactive consumer only exists, that is, he/she does not
consume the dirty good and does not discharge any pollution.
The active consumer maximizes U¥Q) + y subject to pQ +y - m, where p denotes the price
of the dirty good, y denotes the amount of the numeraire good whose price is normalized
to 1, and m denotes the income of the representative consumer. We assume that U(Q) is a
thrice-continuously differentiable and strictly concave in Q > 0. Solving the maximization
problem of the representative consumer, we get that p - U′IQ). Further more, we define
p(Q) as U (Q), the inverse demand function We make the following assumption with regard
to p(Q) and cJqt)
Assu-ption 1. The号nverse demand funcねon and cost function satisfy the following prop-
erわes.
4) We consider that the raison d'etre of the local public firm is to protect the interests of the consumer
in the region where it is located… Therefore, we consider the case where the local publicかm and
active consumer exist m the same region
蝣v*
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i) p(Q) zs twice-continuously different!αble for all Q > 0 andp {Q) < 0;
(a) <(?.) >O. <(gま)≧Oforallqt >0, andc,(0)-0:
>") cqC?) ≧ ci(?)> f-r a119> -・
In our model, pollution is generated and is harmful to the environment. We consider the
following two types of pollution pollution because of consumption of the dirty good and
pollution because of the dirty good's production.5'we refer to the former type of pollution as
・consumption externality" and the latter as "production externality " Consuming/produL1ng
one unit of a dirty good generates one unit of pollution. The pollution is converted into
environmeiltal damage that reduces the consumer surplus via lump-sura transfer. The total
pollution in region I is denoted by Ef, total environmental damage in region I is denoted by
Di(Ei) We make the following assumption on the environmental damage function.
Assumption 2… The environmental damage function saわsfies the following property.
D[(Ei] >0, D';(Ei) > OforallEt >0, and」>,(0) -0
We assume that the pollution is tranhboundary and may also affect the environment of
region B. Figure 1 shows the level of transboundary pollution and the location patterns of
the two伝rms in consumption externality, Figure 2 shows the same in production externality.
In these figures, each numbered shape of a plant represents the location of each丘I and
the shape of a man represents the location of the active consumer. As an example, we pick
case (AA) of consumption externality (explained later) and explain transboundary pollution.
Pollution is generated only in region A; the amount of pollution generated is Q We assume
that region A is located upstream (by a river or m the path of a wind), and therefore, some
of the pollution is transmitted to region B located downstream. The ratio of the pollution
that remains in region A is 0, therefore, the ratio of the pollution that gets transi- 1tted to
regionB is (ト　As aresult, the pollution levels in region A and B are8Q and (1 -t
respectivelv..
In subsequent analysis, we analyze eight cases foin cases in consumption externality
(showed in Figure 1) and four cases in production externality (showed in Figuie 2).
Welfare in region I and k is de丘ned as the sura of consumer surplus {CS} and pioducei
surplus, and the environmental damage…
If both firms 0 and 1 arc located in region I, welfare m region I is given by
s) We do not consider a case where the pollution is caused by both consumption and production…
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; <AA)　wind
Case (BB)　mBli
i (BA)　wind
Q
Region B　　　イ
Figure 1 Four Cases in Consumption Externality
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Case <AA)　wuK]
Case (BB)
Case (AB)　wind
Case (BA)
Figure 2　Four Cases in Production Externality
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TO, - CS+7TO+TTi -A(-Bi)+m.
As the inactive consumer only exists, and therefore, we私,re in region k is given by
v>k - -Dk(Ek)
l=
(2)
If丘rm 0 is located in region ( and丘rm 1, region k, welfare in the two regions is given by
w, - CS+7To -Di(E{)+m,
wk - 7Ti -Dk(Ek)
Note that Et and E,たdepend on the type of externality, and therefore, we derive E[ and E^
on a case-by-case basis…
Welfare m this economy is defined as the sum of welfare in region A and that m region B.
Thus,
W(qo,Ql) - V" +v>k:
- I, p(z)dz-∑ :.(ォ.)-」>(」,)+-.　(5)
We denote welfare in region. I as "local welfare I'and welfare in the entire economy as
'whole welfare.
The objective of丘rm 1 is to maximize its own profits. Before privatization, the objective
of firm 0 is to maximize the local welfare of the region where it exists 6'After privatization.
the objective of丘rm 0 is to maxiiltiize its own profits. We make the following assumptions to
guarantee that the equilibrium exists and is unique.
Assumption 3.
6) Earlier studies model the following two objectives of the public firm, maximization of social wel-
fare in its region (that is, the region where it exists) and maximization of the sum of consumer
surplus and producer surplus in its region Beladi and Chao (2006) and Ohori (2006b) model the
latter ln particular, Ohori (2006b) considers consumption externality In this paper, however,
we model the former, even though the objective of the public firm in Ohori (2006b) is convincing
when we consider consumption externality This is the reason why there exist two distortions in
terms of social welfare maximization・ both the public丘rm and the private丘rm do not maximize
bOLidl welfare. In this* Letse, dibtmguibhiiig the effect* uii bocid.1 welfare ib more Loinplex thdii when
the public丘rm is the social welfare maximizer. Furthermore, we consider that the characteristic
differences between consumption externality and production externality exist only in the locations
where the active consumer and the丘rms are located If we reconsider Beladi and Chao (2006) and
Ohon (2006b) using the setting of the former instead of the setting of the latter, the results might
change
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The above assumption implies that the elasticity of the slope of theユnverse demand nine-
tion is less than 1. By this assumption, we can丘nd that the second order condition of the
maximization problem of each丘rm is negative.
First best allocation
We consider the丘rst best allocation of this model On maximizing whole welfia 1 W with
respect to q% (甘- 0, 1), we obtain the following equation
p{Q') - <(?サ*ト∑D[(El) - 0,
where q: is the solution of the above equations, (qo, qi) - (g.昌　is the first best allocation.
Note that the output ofeach丘rm is chosen in order to equalize its own marginal cost and the
marginal environmental damage to the market price・
In the rest section, we analyze the following four cases in consumption externality and m
production externality: (AA), both丘rms 0 and 1 exist in region A; (BB), both后rms 0 and
1 exist in region B; (AB), firm 0 exists in region A and fiim 1 exists in region B; and (BA),
hm 0 exists in region B and firm 1 exists in region A. In the above two-alphabet relations.
the letter on the left gives the location of firm 0 and the letter on the right, the location of
柑nnrni
In order to observe the e恥ct of privatization, we derive the equilibrium outcome of each
case in pure duopoly (that is, aftei piivatization) m the next section.
3. Pure duopoly (after privatization)
We derive the equilibrium output of each firm a托er pnvatization. In this case, there are
two private firms whose objectives are to maximize their own profits・ In equilibrium, firm i
chooses its output so as to &atisfy
聖竺
oqa
塾
9(7 1
-p(Q)+p′(Q)ォ0-<乙1-0.
-p(Q)+p'(Q)qi -cUqi) -O.
Solving the above equations, we obtain the equilibrium output of each丘rm. We denote the
equihbiiui一.1 outputs of the五rms 0 and 1 as q(; and gf , respectively. N denotes the equilib-
num outcome after privatization From point (iii) of Assumption 1, we get q(j ≦ gf. Further.
m
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from (6) and (7), we丘nd that these equilibrium outputs do not depend on 9. In equilibrium,
a change in 9 may affect at most only the pollution level of each region.
Note that the equilibrium output of each丘rm after privatization is the same in all cases of
consumption externality and production externality
4. Consumption externality
ln this section, we derive the equilibrium outcome and compare the welfare before and after
privatization in each case in consumption externality. Before the analysis, we assume that in
terms of whole welfare, the equilibrium output of each firm after privatization is larger than
that m the first best production allocation. In order to examine this situation, we assume the
following.
Assumption 4.
p'(QN)QN +D'l(QN) > 0. (8)
Note that the fraction of transboundary pollution does not affect the equilibrium outcome
before and after privatization in cases (BB) and (BA) 7> In the subsequent analyses in con-
sumption externality, we examine cases (AA) and (AB),
・ 1 Case (AA) in mixed duopoly (before privatization)
We consider the case where both丘rms 0 and 1 exist in region A.
Local welfare A, local welfare B, and whole welfare are defined as
-r
wA-Ip(s)ds-
wB--DB(EB),
w-r
co(go) -ei(gi) - Da(Ea) +m.
p(s)ds - co(qo) -ci(ォi) - DA(EA) - DbIEb) +m.
whereEA -8Q andEB - (1 -6)Q
In mixed duopoly, the first order condition of each丘rm is given by
∴・
壁土
09i
p(Q)-ci乙(?o) -OD,!EA) -0.
p(Q) +P′(Q)?i - ci(?i) - O.
????????????
By solving the above丘rst order conditions, we obtain ggAA - qkAA(o) and q¥AA - qfAA{6),
7) See Appendix A.
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the equilibrium outputs of丘rm 0 and 1 We use the superscript CAA to denote the equi-
1ibiium outcome m case (AA) before privatization in consumption externality. This super-
script is also used to represent the equilibrium outcome m subsequent sections. Note that cr
r - AA, BB, AB, BA) denotes "case (r) before privatization mぐonsumption externality,"
pr, "case (r) before privatization in pioduction externality;*'Ncr, "case (r) after privatization
in consumption externality: land Npi , "case (r) after privatization in production externality.1'
Here, we analyze the comparative statics for the equilibrium output of each firm with respect
to e We hnd that8'
悪くO,霊ヱ>O, and等<o　　　(14)
Should the local public丘rm be privatized when the fraction of transboundary
pollution changes? (welfare comparison)
We compare the local welfare of each region and whole welfare before and after privati-
zation As we do not use the sped五c functional form of demand, cost, and environmental
functions, we focus on the following points to examine the e斤ect of privatization First, we
氏id 9 under which the equilibrium output of each firm is the same before and after privatiza-
tion and denote it as 0 Needless to say, under 9, the local welfare of each region and whole
weぬre do not change regardless of whether or not the local public fiim is privatized. Second,
we examine whether privatization enhances welfare when 6 shifts marginally from (
First, we identify 9. Compaimg the丘rst order conditions before and after privatization,
we find that only the first order condition of firm 0 di斤ers On coiluparing the丘rst order
conditions of丘rm 0 before and after privatization, we obtain the following condition
AQn)qS十6cAAD'A(EAAA) - 0,15)
蝣e;aa - , rAAQN and 9cAA is the value of 9 in case (AA) in consumption external-
1ty OD‥(」¥t) is increasing in 9 because ∂OD'^Ea)/∂・6 - D'AE。a) + 8QDK(EA) > 0 and
p'{Q )<?() *s a finite negative constant… Therefore, we can prove that百(一1 exists m [0. 1] and
isunique.When9-9 ,q^　ぐ")-?,"蝣
Next, we examine whether privatization enhances local welfare A, local welfaiP B. and
whole welfare if 0 shifts marginally from 9 We denote w]A4(#) as wi(qQAA(8),好AA(6)) and
W'AA(B) as W(q,昌4(o),9i "((?)) In the subsequent analyses. wo use similar notations in
s) Foi caicu】ations, see Appendix B-1
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other cases. Using the first order condition of each firm, we can丘nd that
s-SCAA-P′(q㌢-90")誓≧(16)
le=∂p。ノ--(1-FAA)D'B等>O,(17)
L=百。-(
--¥AAトe"AA)D'B誓-pv-9ow)誓>O,(18)
dwTA dwN,
d6　　　　dB
dw碧A dw^AA
面　~~面　8=∂cAA
dWc-　　dWh
de m
where strictly inequality holds if (乙≠ c¥ 9' From the above results, we get the following
proposition
proposition 1. When 6 marginally increases (decreases) at 9　, privatiz氏tion weakly de-
creases (increases) local welfare A. It also decreases (increases) local welfare B and whole
welfare
The intuition behind proportion 1 is as follows. Let us consider the situation before pri-
vatization… When 6 increases, the output of the local public firm decreases and that of the
private firm increases; the total output decreases. Thus, consumer surplus decreases. ProEt
of the local public丘rm decreases and that of the private firm increases, producer surplus in-
;reases.10) The effect of 9 0n the environmental damage is divided into two: direct e鮎ct and
indirect effect The direct effect is the e:庁ect that 6 has on pollution. This effect is corlimon
not only under privatization but also when there is no privatization The indirect effect is the
effect that the change in the output of each firm has on pollution… Comparing welfare before
and after privatization, we observe that the direct effect is offset, and therefore, we focus only
on indirect effect As total output decreases as 0 increases, indirect effect is positive for local
welfare A and local welfare B Given that the two positive effects are larger than or equal to
the single negative effect, local welfare A increases or remain unchanged If the production
cost of the local public丘rm is btrictly larger than that of the private丘rui, local welfare A
increases since production inefficiency decreases Since local welfare B also increases, whole
welfare increases.ll'
')Forcalculations,seeAppendixB-1
・o)Producersurplusbeforeprivatizationisde丘nedas∑Tcf(6)When9changes,pro-
ducersurplusisobtainedbyusingthe丘rstorderconditionsandevaluatingat♂Mas
p′{qg(dqiAAltB)+q?(dqlA/M)}.Sinceg"≧<to",dqr。AA/df)<0and¥{d^AA/dS)¥>
¥(dqlAAIM)lp'{qS(dqlAAlde)+q?(.dq{昌A/d8)}>0
n)Cato(2008)obtainsaresultsimilartothatinourProposition1withregardtotheexaminationof
whetherornotprivatizationincreaseswelfarewhenthedegreeofenvironmentaldamagechanges
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If we explicitly suppose the existence of the following three governments: the local gov-
ernments A and B (each is a local welfare maximizer of its own region), and the central
government (it is a whole welfare maxinlizcr) , we can observe that their interests with regard
to privatization of the local public丘rm coincide.
4. 2 Case (AB) m mixed duopoly (before privatization)
We consider the case where firm 0 exi&ts in region A and五rra 1 exists in region B…
Local welfare A, local welfare B, and whole welfare are de丘ned as
-rp(月,ds - co(qo) -p{Q)qi - DA(EA) +-,
wB -7Ti -DB(EB),
-rp(・写)ds-co(ォ0 -ci?i -DA(EA) -Db(Eb) +m:
where EA - OQ and EB - (1 -S)Q. The丘rst order condition ofeach五rm is given by
∴l.
聖上
;i,j,
??????????? ?????????
-p(Q) - 1乙(<70) -V′{Q)gi - eD'A(EA) - O,　　　　　(22)
-p(Q) +p (0)ォi - c',(ォi) - 0-　　　　　　　　　　　(23)
Solving the above equations, we obtain the equilibrium outputs q昌　- qSAB(9) and
q¥AB - q[ (S). Next, we analyze the comparative statics for the equilibrium output of
each丘rm with respect to 6 We負nd that12'
等<o・誓>O,and等<o　　　(24)
Here, we consider the case where 0 such that the equilibrium output of each缶rra before
and after privatization is the same… Therefore, ( 'satisfies the following equation
p′(QN)QN+房　D'a(E'aab) -0. wheie Ec/B -elABQN…　　　(25)
The second term of the above equation is increasing in 0 because ∂6D'A(EA)I∂ > - D'AEA) +
OQDユ¥Ea) > 0 and the first term is a丘nite negativeぐonKtant. Therefore, we can show that
ln 8,.utarky However, he does not consider a transboundary pollution problem Nevertheless, we
can inteipret the change in the degree of environmental damage in his model as corresponding
to the change m transboundary pollution The results of Cato (2008) are very similar to ours.
though Cato (2008) consideis a mixed oligopoly of n private firms and allows丘rms to abate their
emissions Sec Cato　2008) for details
2) For calculations, see Appendix B-2
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exists in [0, 1] and is unique.
Welfare comparison
We examine whether the privatization enhances local welfare A, local welfare B, and whole
welfare if 9 shifts marginally from 8,
le=9'。 -PQo誓<O,　　　　(26)
e=er -p'q㍗誓-(1-gcAB)D鑑三>O,  (27)
-pォ誓+?o笥-(1-ecAB)Db等,o・
28
dvf'i dw NA
.=<。4B
dw%AB dw%cAB
dff
dWAB dWNcAB
d8　　　　　d9
From the above results, we obtain the following proposition x
Proposition 2.附en 0 marginally increases (decreases) at 9 - 6' , prtvaizzaiion decreases
(increases) both local welfare B and whole welfare, whereas if increases (decreases) local welfare
A.
The intuition behind proposition 2 is as follows Consider the situation be丘are privatization,
First, we inspect the change in local welfare A. When 9 increases, the equilibrium output of
the local public firm decreases and that of the private丘rm increases The equilibrium total
output decreases. Therefore, consumer surplus decreases and indirect environmental damage
decreases. From (25), we conclude that the decreases in consumer suiplus and indirect envi-
ronmental damage are offset, and hence, whether or not welfare increases depends on whether
or not producer surplus increases. Producer surplus m region A is equal to the pro丘t of the
local public firm When 9 increases, the revenue of the local public丘rm decreases as there is
an increase in the output of the private鮎m. As a result. producer surplus decreases. There-
fore, local welfare A decreases Next, we inspect the change in local welfare B… We can prove
that local welfare B always increases when S increases because the pro丘t of the private firm
increases and indirect erlvironmental damage decreases as 6 increases. Finally, we inspect the
change in whole welfaie. As the increase in the profit of the private firm is greater than the
decrease in the pro且t of the local public firm, whole welfare increases.
In this case, we note that the interests of the local government which owns the local public
氏rm and the other two governments are in conflict
13) For calculations, see Appendix B-2…
6β
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5. Production externality
In this section, we consider pollution that is caused by production…　As in consumption
externality, we consider four cases, these four cases are shown in Figure 2　However, Cases
(AA) and (BB) in production externality is the same as cases (AA) and (BB), respectively.
in consumption externality. Therefore, we examine cases (AB) and (BA) in the subsequent
subsections
5. 1 Case (AB) in mixed duopoly (before privatization)
We consider the case where firm 0 exists m region A and firm 1 exists m region B.
LOcal welfare A, local welfare B, and whole welfare are de丘ned as
wA -∫ p(s)ds -co(go) -p(Q)qi -Da(Ea) +-.
v>B - Tl -DB(EB),
w-rp(s)ds-COM-ci(9i) -DA(EA)-DB(EB)十-,
where E& -&qo andEq - (1 -6)qo+q¥
In mixed duopoly, the丘rst order condition of each firm is given by
「
壁土
・>'/.
??????????? ??????
p(Q)-c'M-p′　qi-SD'.(EA)-0.　　　　　(32)
p(Q) +p (Q)?i - ci(?i) - O.　　　　　　　　　　(33)
Solving the above equations, we obtain the equilibrium outputs q%　- eft (6) and
<f - qfB(9)… Next, we analyze the comparative statics for the equilibrium output of
each firm with respect to 0. We五nd that14'
悪くo・誓>O, and等竺<O.　　(34)
Here, we consider the case where Spab is such that the equilibrium output of each丘rm
before and after privatization is the same Therefore, 9T B satis丘es the following equation
v'(QN)QN+酔BDU{E¥・ )-0. whereEf"-t　　　　　　(35)
We cannot ascertain whether or not 6P lies in [0, ll solely on the basis of Assumption 4. In
order to ascertain that Op exists in [0, 1] and is unique, we make another assumption for
O For calculations, see Appendix B-3
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case (AB) in production externality.
Assumption 5.
p′(QN)QN + D'A(qサ) ≧ 0. (36)
Welfare comparison
We examine whether privatization enhances local welfare A, local B, and whole welfare if 9
shifts marginally from I
duffdm"
dSM
dm'.tabAw'NpAB
6Sde
8=　6rAB
8=GpAB
--p<K誓>O.　　　　(37)
-p9i誓-D'Rトe?AB)響+響(38)
霊ヱ-些芸_g,AB-(p'ォf-(l-( B)D昌)質-(描+鶴)悪蝣(39)
From the above results, we can obtain the following proposition lo'
proposition 3. When 9 marg%nall　名ncreases (decreases) at 9, pnvaわzation decreases (in-
creases) local welfare A, whereas the effect of privatization is ambiguous for local welfare B
and whole welfare
The intuition behind proposition 3 is as follows Consider the situation before privatiza-
tion. First, we inspect local welfare A. As in case (AB) in consumption externality, we can
show that when 0 marginally increases at 9, indirect environmental damage decreases though
both consumer surplus and producer surplus decrease The difference between consumption
externality and production externality can be attributed to the total pollution in regions A
and B. In region A, pollution levels in production externality and consumption externality
are Sqo and OQ, respectively. Since 0 > dQ/dO > dqo/dB, the decrease in indirect environ-
mental damage is greater than the decrease in consumer surplus Further, the decrease in
environmental damage is greater than the decrease in producer surplus. Consequently, local
welfare A increases. Second, we inspect local welfare B. We can easily五nd that producer
surplus increases. However, there is ambiguity as to whether indirect environmental damage
increases or decreases As total pollution is (1 - 0)qo + </i, the change in indirect environ-
mental damage is (1 - Ojdqo/dO + dqi/dO・ Further the former term is negative and the latter,
is) For calculations, see Appendix B-3…
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positive. If9P is nearly equal to 1, that is, almost all of the pollution emitted by the local
public丘rm remains in region A and little is transmitted to region B, total pollution in region
B can be regarded as q¥. As dq¥/dB > 0, indirect environmental damage increases… If 6"AB
is nearly equal to 0, that is, almost all of the pollution emitted by the local public firm is
transmitted to region B, total pollution in region B can be regarded as Q. As dQ/dOく0,
indirect environmental damage decreases. The value of 9P depends on the functional form
of the inverse demand function, the cost function of each firm, and the environmental damage
function. Therefore, whether or not local welfare B increases is ambiguous. Consequently.
the effect on whole welfare is also ambiguous
5. 2 Case (BA) in mixed duopoly (be丘3re privatization)
We consider the case where firm 0 exists in region B and firm 1 exists in region A… Loca
welfare A. local welfare B, and whole welfare are de丘ned as
lux - iri - Da(Ea),
tサB
w-/
p(s)ds - co(go) -p(Q)qi - DB(EB) +m,
p(ど)ds-co(?0　-cjta) -DAIEA) -Db(Eb)+m,　　　　42
where Ea -Qqi andEb -(1 -&)q¥ 4-qo
In mixed duopoly, the first order condition of each firm is given bv
一一一
聖上
a?i
p(Q) - <=o(<?o) -p'(Q)?i - D'B(EB) - 0,　　　　　(43)
p(Q) +p'(Q)gi - ci(8i) - 0　　　　　　　　　　　(44)
solving the above equations, we obtain the equilibrium outputs q^3　- qnBA{o) and
q?B　- q?B (#), Next, we examine the comparative statics for the equilibrium output of
each firm with respect to 6　We丘nd that"
誓,0,誓<O,and等>o　　　(45)
Here, we consider the case where Qpda is such that the equilibrium output of each丘rm
before and after privatization is the same. Therefore.酔　satisfies the following equation:
p'(QN)QN+D'B(EfA) -Q, where E"BUA - (1-6　　㌢+?。 -　　(46)
6) For calculations, see Appendix B-4
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As in the previous case, we cannot ascertain whether or not 9F lies in [0, 1] sole on the
basis of Assumption 4. In order to ascertain that OpB exists m [0, 1] and is unique, we make
another assumption for case (BA) in production externality,
Assumption 6…
p′(QN)QN + D'B(qS>) ≦ 0 47
Welfare comparison
We examine whether the privatization enhances local welfare A, local B, and whole welfare
if 6 shifts marginally from 9.
dwpBA dw,NvBA
dO
dwl dw"
d6　　　　　dS
6=6pba
9 = apt*ノ1
- pQi誓-杏,PBAD,A誓　　　(48)
- -p'{-(l - S"BA)q^ +g'BAq?}誓　(49)
豊-豊　-pv誓+iS誓)-9pBA(Dゝ一塊)鷲(50)
恥om the above results, we obtain the following relationships.17)
Proposition 4… If DA(E) - DB(E) for all E > 0,
1-1
112
1-3
墓苛-BvBA
e=ァpba
dSdB
dfl
笠-_Kiw%pBA
dWN"B
dtide
d6
墓苛-ァPB.
8=8P:A
dede
dS
>0
・O fort　∈ト将),
≦0
・o for6"B ∈[慕・蒜).
<O
a-biguous fori ∈[学蝣1,
2. 11仇sthe: γ not pnvaわza如n increases local welfare A is amb名がuous.
Proof See Appendix C.
17) For calculations, see Appendix B-4.
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The intuition behind proposition 4 is as follows Consider the situation before privatiza-
tion First, we inspect local welfare B. When S increases, the output of the local public firm
inぐ　i since the transboundary pollution from region A decreases- further, the output of
the private firm decreases and total output increases. As in the previously-analyzed cases, the
effect of the increase in 9 0n the output of each firm is opposite in this case, therefore, we can
easily prove that consumer surplus and producer surplus increases with 0. with respect to
indirect environmental damage, we五nd that it increases ls) If SpBA is nearly equal to 1, the
total pollution in region B can be regarded as cff. As dqa/d8 > dQ/dS > 0, the increase in
pollution is large. In this case, the effect of environmental damage is greater than the other
two positive e庁cts, and therefore, local welfare B decreases… If 6''BA is nearly equal to 0, the
total pollution in region B can be regarded as Q". In this case, the increase in pollution is
small since dqo/dO > dQ/dO > 0 As a result, the e庁ct of environmental damage is less than
the other two positive effects, and hence, local welfare B increases. 1"'Second, we inspect local
welfare A. We can easily丘nd that producer surplus and indirect environmental damage de-
crease as 8 increases. Whether or not local welfare A increases depends on the value of 9pBA
If OpBA is nearly equal to 0. the effect of the decrease in producer surplus is the only effect
that remains Therefore, local welfare A decreases However, whether or not local welfare A
increases is ambiguous when BpBA is high Finally, we inspect whole welfare. If酔β 1 is nearly
equal to 0, from (46), we丘nd that the effect of the change in the producer surplus is the only
effect that lemains… As the increase in the producer surplus of region B is smaller than the
decrease in the producer surplus of region A, whole welfare decreases However, when 6P
is high, whether or not whole welfare increases is ambiguous and depends on the functional
form of the inverse demand function, cost function, and the environmental damage function
ln this case, the interests of the local government that owns the local public firm and the
central government are in conflict if 6pBA is sufficiently low, but coincidence when 6pBA is
llaoderately large The threshold fraction of transboundary pollution is important.
Here, we provides the examples of case& (AB) and (BA) in production externality Suppose
t)EB - (l -0)q',BA +qlBA When D increases. dEa/dB - -jfBA + (1 -0)(dq冒A/de) +dqfAldサ
6 affects the伝rst term directly and the other teims. indirectly By compaimg dvi"B jdB
nd dwg jdO, we conclude that the first term is canceled o叫md theiefore, we focus on
(ト伊){dqlBAld8) + dqSBA/d6 and fii-d that it is positive since dQpBA/d9 > 0・
is) Note th叫　　　　is nearly equal to 1, the effect of the inぐTease m producer surplus is the
only effect that remains since the increase in consumer surplus is offset by the increase in indirect
environmental damage
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the follow　　　丘c functional form of the demand, cost, and environme血al damage func-
tions, p(Q) - l-9b -7i, co(ォo) - cqS/2, 01(91) - 9至/2, DA(E) - DB(E) - dE2/2. After the
privatization, the equilibrium output ofeach鮎m is qg - 2/(5+3c) andォf - (1+c)/(5+3c).
onQq andq^,wecanderiveか　W(3+c)/(2(2)and♂ 1 - (3+c)(d-1)/{(l十ぐ)d)
The results are shown in Table 1 and 2
In each grid of Table 1 and 2, to, (( - A, B) and W represent {dwfT/dS-dwf'T/dO}ie = srr
and {dWr/de - dW'Vj>T/dO}|e = )rT, (t - AB, BA), respectively. By assigning the values
indicated in column and row to the parameters ot c and d in these calculations and 8rT we
obtain the results m Table 1 and 2. Note that "n.a." implies that S does not exist in [0,1]
under these parameters of c and d
Rom Table 1 and 2, with regard toバambiguous" in Prospotion 3 and 4, there are cases
that the sign is positive and there are also cases that its sign is negativ
> ＼ヾ
2 45 ¥ 12ー5 18
1 via:1′48 via.1/32 km l/24 wa-5/96 Ji 1Hi
vib 1/48 we 3/32 wB.3/8 wB 95/96 wB 33/16
W :1/24 W :1/8 γーー5/12 W :25/24 W:17/8
S,AB , B=2/3 古PAS=1′2 erAe=2′5 B=l/3
13
n.a. na
vja'14′3993 via 35/7986 WA 7′1331
wB -70′3993 wb--25/2662 wb 21/1331
Ⅳ ニー56′3993 W -20/3993 γー.28′1331
gpAB , epAB=4′5 秤 -2′3
Table 1 The relationship in Proposition 3 under several values of c and d
> ヾ
1 2 4 s
1 .蝣,-;llJS
via l/128
Ⅳこ-1′64
伊BA=0
WJ4…-1/96
Wb'--1′96
U:-1IS
SvBA ,
n.a na.
13 Wa--147/21296 wA -161′15972 via -21/45254 Wa 245′3993
via-7/21296 WB 3ー5/15972 wb -287/45254 wb:-49′3993
ダーニ-35′5324 W:-49/3993 W:】14/2057 Ⅳこ196/3993
eBA=a ♂VBA=4′7 "=6/7 EpBA ,
Table 2　The relationship in Proposition 4 under several values of c and d
6. Concluding remarks
This paper examines the effect that the privatization of a local public firm has on the local
relfare of each region and the welfare of the entire economy when the fraction of unidirec-
tional transboundary pollution vanes… We analyze this problem by considering eight separate
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ases on the basis of the location of firms and the types of pollution.
We consider the case where there exists a certain fraction of transboundary pollution for
fhich the equilibrium outcome before and after privatization is the same When the fraction
of transboundary pollution marginally decreases at this level- that is, the amount of pollution
that is transmitted downstream incr・eases, we obtain the following results.
1. When both丘rms exist upstieam, privatization of the local public firm increases local
welfare of each region and the whole welfare regardless of whether there is consumption
externality or production externality.
2. When the local public firm exists upstream and the private firm, downstream, in con-
mmption externality, privatization decreases local welfare upstream, and increases both
local welfare in downstream and whole welfare. In production externality, privatization
increases local welfare upstieara; its effect is ambiguous for local welfare downstream and
whole welfare.
3. When the local public丘rm exists downstream and the private firm, upstream, in produc-
tion externality, privatization increases local welfare downstream, and decreases whole
welfare if the threshold丘action of transboundary pollution is sufficiently low. However,
it decreases not only local welfare downstream but also whole welfare if the threshold
fraction of transboundary pollution is moderately large…
We find that the effects of the privatization might differ for (1) each location pattern even
if the pollution type is the same, (li) each pollution type even if the location pattern is the
same, and (lii) the di庁brent values of the threshold fraction of transboundary pollution even
if both the location pattern and pollution type are the same
We consider the possible implication of our results… We take the relationship between China
nd Japan as an example with regard to the tiash that washes up on Japanese shores or i
pollution. If there exist only Chinese public and private firms in the Chinese market, case
(AA) (in both consumption externality and production externality) seems applicable From
our lesults, we can see that the privatization of the Chinese public firm enhances not only
welfare in China but also welfare m Japan In this case, privatization is desirable for both
China and Japan However, if Japanese private firm enters the Chinese market and interim-
tional mixed oligopoly occurs, privatization may lead to a conflict of interest… We have to pay
attention to how privatization in a certain region would affect not or-1y its region buもalso the
other regions.
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This paper considers the privatization problem under the unidirectional transboundary pol-
lution problem in a simple framework, and therefore, we can consider several extensions of
this analysis. We leave these for future research.
Appendix A
Case (BB) in consumption externality and production externality in mixed
duopoly (before privatization)
We consider the case where both銭rms 0 and 1 exist in region B
Local welfare A, local welfare B, and whole welfare are de丘ned as
wA -0.
p(a)da - co(?o) - ci(ォi) - DB(EB) + m,
p(s)ds - co(go) - ci(qi) - DB(EB) + m.
where EB - Q. The丘rst order condition of each負rm is given by
∴一
聖上
.蝣></,
-p(Q) - COM - D'B(EB) - 0,
-p(Q) +p'(Q)qi -4(9i) - O.
By solving the above丘rst order conditions, we obtain qt占　and q呈. the equilibrium out-
puts of firms 0 and 1, respectively・ We can easily find that the equilibrium outcome does
not depend on 6　Further, the fraction of transboundary pollution does not appear in case
(BB) Therefore, a shift in the fraction of transboundary pollution does not in臥Ience the
privatizat ion decision.
Note that this case corresponds with the basic model of the er-vironmental problem in
mixed duopoly, one region with no abatement effort and no transboundary pollution prob-
lem. BArcena-Ruiz and Garzon (2007) analyze this case and show that privatization worsens
local welfare B. and thus, also worsens whole welfare
Case (BA) in consu-ption externality in mixed duopoly (before privatization)
We consider the case where firm 0 exists in region B and五rm 1 exists in region A・
Local welfare A, local welfare B, and whole welfare are de丘ned as
WA=汀1,
.('
(56)
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wn
w-r
p(a)ds - ro(go) -p?i - DB(EB) + m,　　　　　　(57)
p(i)rf占- co(so) - ci(9i) - DB(EB) +m,　　　　　(58)
whore EB - Q The丘rst order condition ofeach丘rm is given by
〕.
聖上
∂ql
-p(Q)一<-o(qo) -pgi -d'b{eb) -0,
-p(Q) +p'(G)9i - eUォi) - 0
By solving the above五rst order conditions, we obtain QqBA and q冒B , the equilibrium out-
puts of firms 0 and 1, respectively. Note that the equilibrium outcome does not depend on 6.
Further, as m case (BB), a shift in the fraction of transboundary pollution does not influence
the privatization decision…
Appendix B
B-l. Case (AA) in consumption externality
comparative statics for g.呂A(6), q{AA{9), and Q'AA(6)
(票AA霊0(萎)-(如β冒AD'i
where we denote w?AA - ∂2W気4A/∂・q,dq, and </・* - ∂2汀呈AA/∂ql∂ (hj - 0,1)
In the subsequent analyses in Appendix B, we use the terms w呂, w^, 7rfj, and ir13
V - AA,BB,AB,BA) similaily. Note that w,呂S*.W昌子A.7T冒AA. and w[fA < 0.20> We de-
notethat△`AA ,,,CAA-<-AA　-..呂i　*i。 >O Wefindthat
霊ヱ-盟(」>'+oQcA甥)く　　　　(61)
誓丁鑑(Dl+8QcAAD"A)>Q.　　(62)
dQcAA　　　-l - 7T宣告A
dO　　　　△c AA
The last inequality holds since |tt|凸> M。
(D′ + OQくAAD完)くO…　　　　　　(63)
Comparative statics for w'A, (#), w㍍ '(<?), and Wr Am
・")m昌。44 -p'-c'。'-e2D呈, waf　-p'-e2D完, nf。* -p'+p′′gi, and Trii　-2p'+p〝ql -Cl
をt;.V、蝣f-ォc要　地3-1埜　靭1蝣・1J
Using the丘rst order condition of each丘rm, we can find that before privatization,
dwc.A
一面I~~
dw%
■現S
dWc-
(ffl
-一曲l+OD¥)霊ヱーQcAAD'A,
--D'B¥-QcAA+(ト0)等>0,
-- (l-6)D昌誓-{p'qlAA+eD'A+(l-6)D'B}霊ニ
ーQ'AA(D'A - D'B) (66)
Comparative statics for w%cAA(8), w%cAA(6), and WNcAA(6)
After privatization, the equilibrium output of each firm is q, - g" and does not depend on
'. Thus, we obtain
dwTAA
一面---QND'A<0,
dwi
m
dⅥ′ NcAA
dO
- QND'B > 0,
- - QN(D'A - D'R
B-2.Case(AB)mtheconsumptionexternality
Comparativestaticsforg.昌3w,.冒AB{9),andQ'AB(6)
(霊<AB
'01
-cAB萎D'A+8冒Bm
Wedenotethat△一?。。wl1-WoLヂB,T呈許>0.21サWe丘ndthat
霊ヱ-盟(D′+BQcABD'^)く0,
壁竺一浩(D′+eQcA甥)>0,
6,6
dty-
<w　　　　　上. It-(」>'+ SQcABD笠) < o
Comparative statics for w'/B(6), vApB{6), and W B(6)
Using the五rst order condition of each firm, we can丘nd that before privatization,
21)Ml昌r - p -　　-4-e'2DK < 0, W誰8 -イ　ー62D'L　　- p'+p′′</i, and
*¥r - 2p′ +p"gi -c'{
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d<サ
~議「
dwtf B
i遜■
dWe-
de
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- - (p'qtAB + 6D'A)霊ヱーCfABD'A-　　　　　(73)
-v?r誓-D'n -C '+(1-6)鷲- >O.　(74)
- {Af3 - (i-e)D'B}誓-{p'g^+SD'A+(ト0)Dも)霊ヱ
- QcAB(D'A - DL)
Comparative statics for w^　B(サ),　ぐB(B), and WNcAB(9)
After privatization.
dwN,
一面一一ニーQNcABD'A < 0,
篭竺-QN JJf>叫
dWAノlB
<m - - QN'AB(D'A - D'B).
B-3.Case(AB)inproductionexternality
comparativestaticsfor<冒B(o),andQ'AB{e)
(票...pAB
サAB萎iyA+eqzABD"A
。
Wedenotethat△pAB-,,,VABpAB一顧"1。蝣0.22'We丘ndthat
A;,',
ii童i
dq¥'
■成案
盟(D'A + eqZABD'i) < 0,
-悪芸(小堀AB矧,o・
IpAl-7rlOdO　　　　　△pAB{D',+6tf　現)く0
comparative statics for u-PAB(9), w"BAB(6), and W"AB(6)
Using the first order condition of each fin-i, we can find that before privatization
些農- -p'vi誓- 9。D'A,de
79
(75)
82
^<。 -p'-C。-p"gi-92D完< O,<r - -pV <。4B -p′+p"qi, andirfj　-2p'+p′′91-Ci
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dwPr
~~面一
dWAB
de
-p'il徳- -D'B ¥ -qlAB+(ト0)響+誓　　(83)
-{p'q1-(l-e)D'B}誓-{p'll十D呂‡誓-Qa(Dユーから(84)
Comparativestaticsforw"pAB{8),wgpAB(o),andWN'AB(B)
Afterprivatization,
dw"--1SD'Aく0.
dB
dwNB>AB -qSD'B>0,dO AU/NpA B
did
B-4… Case (BA) in production externality
--qs(D'a-D旨).
ComparativestaticsforQP。BA(8),<R4(fl),andQ"BA(o)
pBA
pBA^1。<A萎-91
Wedenotethat△pBA-冒?vf・4-W冒P一蝣V^>o…23サWefindthat
rfftfde盟(ォr職,o・
Ku一訂盟。qぎBAD%)<0,
dQ"BA　　　　-
.I(J　　　　　　上i-HA(ォr-4os) > O.
Comparative statics for wfA(B), WPBBA(9), and WBA(e)
Using the first order condition of each firm, we can find that before privatization,
響-p'9f誓ニーD'A　襟),
些㌍ニー{p'sr'+u -S)D'B}誓+</T"D昌,<M
aサtttぎr - p′ -C。 -p〝ql -D';く0,　　　-p′′9i - (1 -B)D'i、汀wA - p'+p"qi.サnd
> -2p′+pJJ91 -Ci
so
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-訂-p'1f誓-W-+^+(i-サW誓-qfA{D'A-D'B). (93)dWBA
Comparative statics for w"PBA(o), wz"BA(e), and WN"BA(8)
After privatization,
∂　NpBA
--1?Dゝ<0.
∂β
dwtNpBA
- q?D'B >0..∂β
∂lγNpBA
∂β
-i?r(^-DL)
Appendix C
Proof of Proposition 4
proof. First, we examine dwvB /dO-dwB　7<サ　　. We can easily丘nd tha-p′ > 0
and dcfi3 /d8 < 0. We focus on the sign of the brace. If the brace is negative (positive), that
IS,if
-(1-節")ォ"+S"B r<o⇔QpBA
-(1-ァ'BA)qS+ァ'B距0-gpBA >甚　　(97)
dwt /d6 - dwNa"BA/　　is positive (negative).
Second, we examine dWpBA/ 1 - dWNl>BA/　Spb* We五nd that
p'ftA誓・q濫)く0.　(98)
Therefore, dWBA/dO-dWN"BA/dB¥ = - ,く0 1ト百　A(D'A -DもmrvdB)く0・
Given that -ffpBA ≦ 0 and dq冒BA/d6く0, we need to ascertain the sign of D'A - D呂.
To simplify the analysis, we assume that Da(E) - Db{E) for all E ～ OI
Given that 」? -6vBAqj? and Eg - (1 -BrBA)q^+qr. weget Eg < E%, if,
・p-[qz < (l-S>BA)q?+qr -宙PBAく蒜…　　(99)
In this case, dWBA/d8-dWNpBA/d9¥l) = SrBA < 0 Note that this is the just enough
condition
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Finally, we compare qg/QN and QN/2?㍗, and easily find that 0 < g"/<2Aく2*72?:㍗ ≦
蝣
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